“The Ravatomanga case exposes the limits of traditional due diligence”

Axcel Chenney, Investigative Journalist and CEO of Chenney Intelligence Advisory

• Chenney Intelligence Advisory (CIA) positions itself at the intersection of investigative journalism and strategic risk analysis.

Axcel Chenney, an investigative journalist who this week formalised his intelligence advisory firm, argues that the Ravatomanga affair underlines the structural limits of conventional due diligence. While compliance frameworks rely on documentation and formal classifications, he contends that they often fail to capture informal power networks and political exposure. Through Chenney Intelligence Advisory, he seeks to apply the discipline of investigative reporting to risk assessment for investors and diplomatic actors operating in volatile environments.

This week, you launched Chenney Intelligence Advisory, a firm that provides economic and political intelligence to investors and embassies. So, are you no longer a journalist?

Oh, I am! And more than ever. I am freelancing with some international media outlets. And I am still pursuing my PhD in the safety of investigative journalists covering cross-border financial crime.

With regards to the firm that is being formalised this week, it brings the rigour, methodological discipline, source-verification standards, security, reliability and accountability of investigative journalism into the world of business and, to a lesser extent, diplomacy.

To illustrate, one of our recent assignments involved a major international investor seeking to understand the administrative and political ecosystem surrounding the mining sector in an African country. The investor wanted a realistic assessment of political exposure, including corruption risk and governance stability.

Working alongside a respected investigative journalist from that jurisdiction, we conducted documentary analysis, human-source interviews, and institutional mapping. Our conclusion was that, at that stage, the concentration of decision-making power, institutional vulnerabilities, and informal accounts from previous foreign investors created elevated risk.

We recommended a 12-to-18-month monitoring period. The country was undergoing governance reforms supported by European diplomatic actors, but structural consolidation of power remained a concern.

This type of 40-page contextual intelligence report cannot be produced through checklists alone. It requires trusted human networks, cross-border collaboration, and analytical independence. I may not be employed by a local newsroom today, but I remain a journalist, and CIA operates through investigative networks.

CIA? The name inevitably raises eyebrows…

Listen, it is simply an acronym made up of my name and of this specific activity. Providing intelligence with a journalistic approach was only a small freelance activity I carried out when clients approached me. It is only recently, given the demand, and of course to comply with the law, that I had to begin formalising this activity. A name was required.

I could have asked ChatGPT or Claude AI to come up with one which is commercially neutral, but I chose to attach my name to the firm as a signal of accountability and methodological transparency. Our work combines open-source intelligence — OSINT — with human-source intelligence, HUMINT. The latter is essential. Official documents tell part of the story; informal influence networks tell another. I put my name to this practice because credibility, in this field, is personal.

The investigative connotation is deliberate. For the past fifteen years, I have worked in investigative journalism. That discipline built on evidence-based inquiry, cross-verification, and contextual mapping defines our methodology.

There is also a broader point. We operate in an era of synthetic media, manipulated narratives, and deepfakes. Even official documentation can mislead if not placed in context. The role of intelligence advisory, as we conceive it, is not to accept appearances at face value but to interrogate them.

You are paid by clients. How do you maintain independence?

For 20 years, I was employed by media organisations with their own commercial interests and ownership structures. Independence in journalism has never meant the absence of funding. It means intellectual autonomy despite funding. The same principle applies here. 

Clients come to us precisely because we are independent. We are not business facilitators, nor dealmakers or deal-breakers. We provide contextual truth even when it’s inconvenient.  If an investor wants to understand whether a prospective partner has informal proximity to the ruling political class — and what that proximity could mean in the event of regime change — we investigate, analyse scenarios, and report.

An embassy requires a political forecast? We provide it. 

However, we are selective in the mandates we accept. Engagements that present foreseeable reputational, ethical, or legal risks are declined. Integrity governs every mandate we accept. CIA is grounded in the principle of independent fact-finding and contextual analysis. Our work prioritises accuracy, proportionality, and analytical discipline in every assignment. We work alongside businesses and organisations that are resolutely aligned against corruption, illicit profit shifting, tax evasion, and other unethical practices. Our positioning naturally discourages actors seeking opacity rather than clarity. 

Are you licensed to provide this service?

We are not a regulated financial intermediary, nor do we issue compliance clearance certificates. Our role is analytical, not regulatory.

Traditional due diligence frameworks rely heavily on documentary compliance: KYC files, source-of-funds declarations, sanctions screenings, and formal classifications such as PEP or non-PEP status. These are essential mechanisms. Management companies need to be regulated because the system bears a structural flaw which requires monitoring. While MCs should act as the first filter against dodgy customers, they also have a financial interest in not rejecting them. For any customer they successfully onboard, fees are charged for corporate structuring, setting up the GBCs, SPVS, etc. I won’t say that it’s an evil motivation. I sincerely believe that the vast majority of compliance and onboarding officers in Management Companies and banks are acting lawfully. And I just told you that they have a long checklist made of rigorous policies, important documentation collection, screenings, source of funds declarations, etc. 

But how is it that so many mishaps occur? How did 7 billion dubious rupees – according to the Financial Crime Commission – reach our shores?

The Ravatomanga case — irrespective of individual guilt or innocence — illustrates the structural limits of checklist-based due diligence. A clean compliance file does not necessarily reflect underlying political risk.

So, for you, the Ravatomanga case emanates from structural and regulatory flaws?

This is the best-case scenario. When I look at the standard regulatory checklist, the KYC, the diligence and enhanced diligence requirements, I see a massive blind spot. Influence ecosystems are not assessed. Power concentration is ignored. Regime volatility is set aside. 

I believe that the Management Company, the banks, the regulators; FSC and BoM, relied on legally right documents. But these documents didn’t show the reality. Official certificates don’t show how power really works. A clean compliance file does not map political proximity. This PEP/Non-PEP classification is merely procedural. 

And this is where my colleagues from Africa and I are trying to step in without competing with Management Companies. Our function is different: we assess contextual and exposure risks that traditional compliance frameworks may not fully capture. I am sure that if we had been given the assignment to scrutinise Ravatomanga’s exposure risk we would have provided a rigorous network mapping. We would have talked to trusted human sources in Madagascar. We could have possibly concluded or predicted that if the political situation changed in the client’s home country, his financial position could quickly become legally or reputationally exposed. 

Chenney Intelligence Advisory positions itself at the intersection of investigative journalism and strategic risk analysis. We argue that in an era of formal compliance saturation, understanding informal power structures may be the missing layer in modern due diligence.

You talked about the best-case scenario. What is the worst-case?

That we hear, down the line, that institutional gatekeepers were bribed.

How is Mauritius performing economically?

The economic indicators are concerning. Official data show contraction in foreign direct investment. For a small, externally oriented economy, sustained investor confidence is essential. Public frustration is visible. Economic strain affects productivity, social cohesion, and long-term competitiveness. 

At the same time, the growth of illicit economies presents a parallel challenge. Beyond public health implications, the expansion of drug trafficking and informal capital flows distorts the formal financial system and undermines macroeconomic stability.

One of the key risks for Mauritius would be renewed enhanced international monitoring, such as a return to the FATF grey list. The reputational and financial consequences would be significant. Preventing such outcomes requires systemic vigilance and institutional coherence.

Could that happen?

I sincerely hope not. The political leadership has acknowledged the urgency of strengthening financial governance frameworks. Whether that translates into sustained structural reform remains to be seen. For a country positioning itself as a financial hub, credibility is not optional. It is existential. Over and above everything we have discussed, there is one supreme rule: only sound governance attracts sustainable investment. This is the recipe.